Abstract
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) posits that people moralize at least six distinct kinds of virtues. These virtues are divided into “individualizing” and “binding” virtues. Despite widespread enthusiasm for MFT, it is unknown how plausible it is as a model of people's conceptualizations of the moral domain. In this research, we take a bottom-up approach to characterizing people's conceptualization of the moral domain, and derive a taxonomy of morality that does not resemble MFT. We find that this model more accurately reflects people's theories of morality than does MFT.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2016 |
| Editors | Anna Papafragou, Daniel Grodner, Daniel Mirman, John C. Trueswell |
| Publisher | The Cognitive Science Society |
| Pages | 2303-2308 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780991196739 |
| State | Published - 2016 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: Recognizing and Representing Events, CogSci 2016 - Philadelphia, United States Duration: Aug 10 2016 → Aug 13 2016 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2016 |
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Conference
| Conference | 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: Recognizing and Representing Events, CogSci 2016 |
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| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | Philadelphia |
| Period | 8/10/16 → 8/13/16 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2016 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2016. All rights reserved.
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Artificial Intelligence
- Computer Science Applications
- Human-Computer Interaction
- Cognitive Neuroscience
Keywords
- categorization
- concepts
- inductive reasoning
- morality
- taxonomies