Moral judgments as conceptual representations

In this chapter, we take a concepts-and-categories approach to understanding moral judgments, with a focus on two questions. First, what is the structure of people’s representations of the moral domain? We examine several theories which plausibly predict taxonomic structures, focusing on the CAD Triad Hypothesis and multiple versions of Moral Foundations Theory. The limited empirical work on such representational structures does not clearly agree with any of these theories. Second, what are the features ascribed to acts that are categorized as moral violations? Again, we review several theories that suggest answers, focusing on Social Domain Theory and the Theory of Dyadic Morality. The limited empirical work on feature ascription to moral stimuli generally concurs with these theories, with some caveats. Lastly, we sketch a framework that incorporates insights from several approaches. Applying a concepts-and-categories perspective to moral judgment dissolves several apparent disagreements and generates new questions for future research.