The Impact of CEO Long-Term Equity-Based Compensation Incentives on Economic Growth in Collectivist versus Individualist Countries

  • Jack De Jong
  • , Cynthia J. Campbell
  • , Rosita P. Chang
  • , Robert Doktor
  • , Lars Oxelheim
  • , Trond Randoy

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    This study examines the impact of the prevalence of long-term equity-based chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on GDP growth, and we address the moderating role of individualist versus collectivist cultures on this relationship. We argue that long-term incentives given to CEOs in some firms may convey to other CEOs that they too may be able to receive such incentives and rewards if they emulate the incentivized and rewarded CEOs. In a longitudinal study across 22 nations over a 5-year period, we find that the higher proportion of CEOs in a country are awarded long-term equity-based incentive compensation, the greater future real GDP growth, particularly in collectivist countries.

    Original languageAmerican English
    JournalAsian Economic Papers
    Volume15
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2016

    Disciplines

    • Business

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